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TORTS
I. FRAUD AND DECEIT
During the survey year, in Gilbert v. Mid-South Machinery
Co. I the supreme court further defined what types of misrepresen-
tations may be justifiably relied upon to give rise to a fraud and
deceit action. The trial court judge had refused to direct a verdict
for the defendants, having found sufficient evidence to support a
fraud and deceit action and to send the case to the jury;2 the
defendants appealed.
In December 1971, James and Cecil Gilbert purchased a
laundromat in Anderson, South Carolina, from Mid-South,
which had exercised a purchase option on the business several
days before selling it to the Gilberts. Thomas Coker, president of
Mid-South, had been contacted by the Gilberts in response to a
newspaper advertisement regarding the facility. During the
course of their negotiations, Coker had represented himself as an
expert in the laundromat business. He told the Gilberts that they
would gross approximately $3,000 per month and that their net
would be $1,000 per month; but in response to their queries about
business records, he told them none existed while, in fact, the
previous owner had kept such records. The deal was struck and
under terms of the sale the Gilberts paid $7,000 in cash to Mid-
South, plus $5,000 amortized over five years, and assumed the
$32,051.24 balance due on a lease agreement with Falco, Inc., the
owner-lessor of the cleaning equipment located in the facility.
Four consecutive months of losses resulted in the Gilberts' failure
to make any further lease payments. A judgment was rendered
against them for $31,960.13, representing the amount due on the
balance of the lease plus attorneys' fees. In July 1973, the Gilberts
instituted an action for fraud and deceit against defendants Mid-
South and Coker. Judge Grimball, in the Court of Common
Pleas, Anderson County, refused to direct a verdict for the defen-
dants and the jury awarded $45,000 actual and $5,000 punitive
1. 267 S.C. 211, 227 S.E.2d 189 (1976).
2. In an action for fraud based on representation in South Carolina, the plaintiff must
prove nine elements: (1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) his intent that it should be acted upon by the person;
(6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on its truth; (8) his right to rely
thereon; (9) and his consequent and proximate injury. Flowers v. Price, 190 S.C. 392, 395,
3 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1939) (citing 26 C.J. Fraud § 6 (1921)).
1
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damages to the Gilberts.3
The supreme court's review centered on Coker's statements
regarding the laundromat's profitability and his denial that any
business records were kept. In order to uphold the lower court, the
supreme court had to overcome the bar of Jones v. Cooper' which
held that if the truth is easily in reach of a party, he cannot rely
on a misstatement of fact.5 The appellants contended that the
plaintiffs had had the opportunity to discover business records
and to discern the profitability of the business for themselves
and, therefore, had no right to rely on the misrepresentations.
The Gilbert court held that since the subject matter of the repre-
sentation in Jones, i.e., the location of vending machines, was
"open, patent, and visible,"' the case was distinguishable from
Gilbert which dealt with a representation regarding something
intangible, such as business profits. Therefore, the plaintiffs were
not precluded from reliance as a matter of law. The court deter-
mined that it was properly a jury question whether the Gilberts
were reasonably prudent in their reliance on Coker's statement.'
As to defendant Coker's denial of the existence of business re-
cords, the court noted initially that the misrepresentations relied
upon to bring a fraud and deceit action must be "predicated on
misstatements of fact rather than misstatements of opinion,",, the
distinction being "that what was susceptible of exact knowledge"
at the time the statement was made is generally a statement of
fact The court viewed the evidence as raising a presumption
that Coker knew that records existed:
3. 267 S.C. at 217-19, 227 S.E.2d at 191-92.
4. 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5 (1959).
5. Id. at 489, 109 S.E.2d at 11. In Jones, the plaintiff relied on an advertisement
stating the income to be derived from an investment as well as on a representation of an
agent of the defendant that certain hot dog cooking machines, which the plaintiff agreed
to purchase, would require servicing only one day a week and would be placed in proper
locations by the defendant. Plaintiff, without checking these locations, initially agreed to
defendant's placements, but the next day he tried to back out of the purchase because
the selected locations were in the poorest sections of town. In the action for fraud against
the seller, the court found the ads stating the probable income of purchasers to be merely
"dealers talk" or "puffing." The court also held that the plaintiff could have found out
the truth of the appropriateness of the locations if he had wanted to since they could have
been easily checked out before the agreement was completed.
6. 267 S.C. at 220, 227 S.E.2d at 193.
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 45 (1968)).
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[It is not necessary, in order to establish fraud, to prove that
the person making the allegedly false representation had actual
knowledge of its falsity; if he makes it as of his personal knowl-
edge, with reckless disregard of his lack of information as to its
truth, his knowledge of its falsity is legally inferable. 0
The statements made to the Gilberts by Coker were found to be
misstatements of fact sufficient to constitute actionable fraud.
Another aspect of the case involved an issue that Justice
Rhodes indicated had never been discussed previously by the
court. The appellants contended that errors in the jury charge
entitled them to a new trial. In his charge, the trial judge had
instructed the jury that the weight of the evidence must be "clear,
cogent, and convincing,"" which is the correct charge in South
Carolina;2 but he also had made references to the plaintiffs hav-
ing the burden of proving his case by the greater weight or
"preponderance of the evidence" test. 3 The supreme court re-
fused to take the isolated segments of the charge which might
possibly have implied a lesser burden of proof, but instead consid-
ered whether the charge, taken as a whole, was consistent with
the requirements as to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence
to prove fraud. The court found the applicable law to be as fol-
lows:
Fraud must be established by a preponderance of the evidence
... .However, the courts have frequently stated that fraud
must be established by evidence that is . . .clear, cogent, and
convincing. . . .These expressions, however, have been inter-
preted to mean only that there must be a preponderance of
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence of
10. Id. at 221, 227 S.E.2d at 193 (quoting Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc., 240 S.C.
26, 34, 124 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1962) (citation omitted)). In Aaron, the court upheld a
judgment against a used car dealer for misrepresenting the mileage on an automobile to
a buyer. The court used this legal inference to find the requisite knowledge of falsity.
11. 267 S.C. at 222, 227 S.E.2d at 194.
12. Carter v. Boyd Constr. Co., 255 S.C. 275, 178 S.E.2d 536 (1971). In Carter, the
supreme court discussed the jury charge as follows:
The jury was correctly instructed that in order for the plaintiff to be entitled to
a verdict he was required to prove fraud by clear, cogent, and convincing evi-
dence. Near the end of his charge, however, his Honor used language which
could have been construed by the jury as meaning that fraud could be proved
by a simple preponderance of the evidence. We doubt if the jury so understood
it, but it would be well for such language to be avoided on a retrial.
Id. at 281-82, 178 S.E.2d at 540.
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moral turpitude or crime, and, while the evidence must be clear
and convincing, such clear and- convincing proof may be met by
a preponderance of the evidence.' 4
Since the charge as a whole embodied these principles, the in-
struction was viewed as proper.
The supreme court upheld the $45,000 actual and $5,000
punitive damages against the defendants stating that "the in-
jured party in a fraud and deceit action is entitled to recover such
damages as will compensate him for his pecuniary loss and place
him in the same position he occupied before being defrauded."' 5
The court determined that the amount of money paid to Mid-
South, the amount of the judgment obtained against the Gilberts
on the balance due on the lease plus attorney's fees, and the
amount of losses the plaintiffs sustained while running the busi-
ness were all proper elements of damages; therefore, the award
was not excessive. That the amount awarded did not reflect any
adjustments for the value of the assets that the Gilberts had
acquired apparently did not concern the court since the
"[d]efendants did not request a more specific charge as to the
measure of damages"' 6 and the trial judge had charged that ac-
tual damages should be any money or pecuniary loss suffered by
the Gilberts proximately resulting from the defendants' alleged
wrongful conduct."
II. DEFAMATION
The twin torts of libel and slander were considered by the
South Carolina courts in several contexts during 1976. Ross v.
Columbia Newspaper, Inc.'8 and Anderson v. Stanco Sports Li-
brary, Inc.'" were both decided for the defendant publishers on
the ground that substantial truth of the alleged libel is a defense
to the allegation in South Carolina. Ross was decided by the
South Carolina Supreme Court, while the Anderson decision was
handed down by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Larry Ross brought his action for libel against Columbia
14. Id. at 222-23, 227 S.E.2d at 194 (quoting 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 114a (1943)).
15. Id. at 223, 227 S.E.2d at 194 (citing Thomas v. American Workmen, 197 S.C. 178,
14 S.E.2d 886 (1941)).
16. Id. at 224, 227 S.E.2d at 194.
17. Id.
18. 266 S.C. 75, 221 S.E.2d 770 (1976).
19. 542 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 99
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss1/13
TORTS
Newspapers after the defendant had published two articles con-
cerning a shooting incident involving Ross and his wife. Ross had
been taken to the police station, where he was fingerprinted and
placed in a cell block. An arrest record was made which indicated
that the charge against him was investigation for assault and
battery with intent to kill. The reporter for the Columbia Record
relied on the offense report to construct his first article headline:
"WOMAN IS SHOT; HUSBAND HELD IN INCIDENT. '2 The
article incorrectly referred to the plaintiff as having been charged
with assault and battery with intent to kill where, in fact, Mrs.
Ross did not press charges, and no warrant was ever issued; the
article further identified the weapon involved as a .22 rifle,
whereas it was a pistol. The next day a second article appeared
under the headline: "MAN QUESTIONED IN WIFE'S DEATH
RELEASED FROM JAIL,"' but the last sentence of the article
correctly reported that Mrs. Ross was in a Columbia hospital.22
The newspaper's defenses were that the articles were substan-
tially true and that the paper was qualifiedly privileged. Judge
Morrison, in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, di-
rected a verdict for the defendant.
The supreme court affirmed the directed verdict on the
grounds that the defense of substantial truth was sufficient, rely-
ing on Dauterman v. State-Record Co.,2 which held that a suffi-
cient defense is made out when the evidence establishes that the
alleged libelous statement is substantially true.24 In Ross, the
court refused to place a strict technical standard for accuracy on
newspaper reporters' use of terms which have precise legal defini-
tions:
The fact that no warrant had been executed during the time
period when the articles were written, does not mean that plain-
tiff was neither arrested nor charged as the terms were used in
the articles. To require such a strict adherence to legal terminol-
ogy from the news media, we think, would be unreasonable.2
20. 266 S.C. at 78, 221 S.E.2d at 772.
21. Id. at 79, 221 S.E.2d at 772.
22. Id.
23. 249 S.C. 512, 154 S.E.2d 919 (1967).
24. Id. at 514, 154 S.E.2d at 919.
25. 266 S.C. at 80, 221 S.E.2d at 773. At trial plaintiffs counsel questioned the
reporter regarding his understanding of certain legal terms:
Q. Did you consider it a charge? That offense report a charge?
A. When a person is arrested for the offense of assault and battery with intent
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The obvious error in the headline was likewise not actionable.
The rule in South Carolina as stated in Jones v. Garner" is that
a headline "must be construed in connection with the article it
precedes to determine whether it had a defamatory meaning.",,
The Ross court reasoned that the last sentence of the article,
which revealed that Mrs. Ross was not dead, "rendered innocu-
ous ' '12 any harm caused by the headline, since the headline had
not referred to the plaintiff by name.
The Dauterman holding that substantial truth is a defense
to a libel action was reinforced by the federal court in Anderson.
The plaintiff was a convicted murderer serving a life sentence.
Detective Cases magazine had used newspaper accounts and the
transcript of the trial record to develop an article initially pub-
lished in April 1966, under the title "Swim With Murder Off Folly
Beach." A second and identical publication of the article in May
1968 was entitled "Double Indemnity for a Sleep-Around Wife."
In the interim between the two publishings, Stanco Sports Li-
brary, Inc. had become publisher of the magazine. Only the sec-
ond article was relevant to the libel action since the statute of
limitations barred any action regarding the first.
29
The Fourth Circuit upheld Judge Chapman's award of sum-
mary judgment for the defendant. The lower court had found that
Anderson was a "public figure" and the event was of "public
interest" which brought the case within the ambit of the holding
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"° and required that actual
malice be proved.3 1 However, the court of appeals felt it unneces-
Q. You consider an offense report a charge?
A. That shows a man was arrested for the offense of assault and battery with
intent to kill and since that was the formal record of the Police Department
available to me, I would assume that he had been charged, yes, sir.
Record at 78.
26. 250 S.C. 479, 158 S.E.2d 909 (1968).
27. Id. at 486, 158 S.E.2d at 912 (citing 33 AM. JUR. Libel and Slander § 88 (1941)).
28, 266 S.C. at 81, 221 S.E.2d at 773.
29. 542 F.2d at 639 n.1.
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. The New York Times case announced the principle that for a public official to
recover damages for defamation he must prove that the statement was made with "actual
malice." 376 U.S. at 279. Judge Craven explained that New York Times involved only
"public officials," but that the principle had been extended to include "public figures,"
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and events of "public concern,"
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). He further explained that the latest
standard is set forth in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and confines the
application of the principle to consideration of the character of the allegedly defamed
party rather than to the newsworthiness of the event. 542 F.2d at 640 n.2.
[Vol. 29
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sary to decide whether a convicted murderer is a public figure and
instead upheld the defense that the article was substantially true:
"Any deviations from the sworn testimony at trial were inconse-
quential embellishments made by the author to add color or in-
terest to the article. They did not cause Anderson's "good name"
to be sullied any more than it already had been by the fact of his
murder conviction. 32
The holdings of Ross and Anderson indicate that the defense
of substantial truth is a significant threshhold to overcome in
libel actions. By relying on this defense, the Ross court avoided
the issue of the newspaper's qualified privilege, and the Anderson
court did not have to determine whether a convicted murderer is
a public figure in order to uphold the district court's summary
judgment.
Another case before the supreme court in 1976 involved the
requirement of publication in a libel or slander action. Since defa-
mation cases involve the protection of reputation, it is essential
that the defamation be communicated to one other than the
plaintiff.33 In Kendrick v. Citizens and Southern National Bank,34
the supreme court used the lack of any susceptible inference of
publication as grounds to reject plaintiffs appeal from the trial
court's granting a summary judgment for the defendant.
Donald Kendrick brought the action in the Common Pleas
Court of Richland County based on an incident with the bank
manager. Kendrick had refused to return money received from
cashing a bad check written to Mrs. Kendrick by one of his ten-
ants. The defendant had cashed the check without investigating
it, since Mr. Kendrick was recognized as a good customer. When
Kendrick refused to reimburse the bank, the manager requested
that he close his account. The alleged libel stemming from the
incident was a statement in a letter from the manager stating,
"'This is to acknowledge our telephone conversation this morn-
ing concerning the check we cashed for you that was no good.' -13
The plaintiff viewed this as implying that he passed bad checks.
32. 542 F.2d at 641. The court cited an example of the legal insignificance of the
alleged libelous statements. Anderson had admitted Mafia connections but claimed he
was libeled by the article attributing to him an admission that he was a "high ranking
member of the Mafia." Id.
33. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971). See Tucker v. Pure Oil Co. of
the Carolinas, 191 S.C. 60, 66, 3 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1939).
34. 266 S.C. 450, 223 S.E.2d 866 (1976).
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The alleged slander occurred during a telephone conversation
between the plaintiff and the bank manager in which the man-
ager was alleged to have said, "'I want you to close your accounts
* , . we do not want your kind of business.' "" The supreme court
rejected the libel claim because the letter was mailed to Mr.
Kendrick at his proper address and opened only by him; there-
fore, there was no publication. The slander claim also failed be-
cause the court held that the telephone conversation was private,
between the plaintiff and the bank manager, and even if a third
party at the bank had overheard the manager's words, there was
no indication that the third party would know to whom the man-
ager was referring in his remarks." Since neither the libel nor the
slander was published, the court affirmed the trial court's sum-
mary judgment for the defendant.
Another libel case considered by the court was Ayers v. Col-
umbia Newspapers, Inc.,3" in which forty guards and employees
from Richland County Detention Center brought a single com-
plaint against the defendant newspaper alleging libel in an article
which referred to the group in an allegedly defamatory manner.
3
1
The court held that Ayers was controlled by the doctrine of Ryder
v. Jefferson Hotel Co.4" and affirmed the trial judge by printing
his order sustaining the defendant's demurrer as a directive of the
supreme court. The principle of Ryder is as follows:
When a tort of a personal nature, as. . . a libel. . . is commit-
ted upon two or more, the right of action must, except in very
few special cases, be several. In order that a joint action may be
possible there must be some prior bond of legal union between
the persons injured . . . of such a nature that the tort interferes
36. Id.
37. Id. at 454, 223 S.E.2d at 867-68. The court cited with approval Neeley v. Winn-
Dixie Greenville, Inc., 255 S.C. 301, 178 S.E.2d 662 (1971), which adopted the rule of 50
Am. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander § 143 (1970):
Defendant's words are actionable only if they refer to some ascertained or ascer-
tainable person, and to be entitled to recover, the plaintiff must show that he
is the person with reference to whom the statement was made .... The lan-
guage used must ... be such that persons reading or hearing it will, in light of
the surrounding circumstances, be able to understand that it refers to the person
complaining, and it must have been so understood by at least one other person.
255 S.C. at 308, 178 S.E.2d at 665.
38. 267 S.C. 103, 226 S.E.2d 252 (1976).
39. The April 24, 1975, article in The State, "Richland Grand Jury Probing Possible
Prison Drug Sale," discussed the possibility of a grand jury investigation concerning a
narcotics ring involving guards and jail personnel. Brief for Respondent at 1.
40. 121 S.C. 72, 113 S.E. 474 (1922).
[Vol. 29
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common to all.'
The lower court found that since the joined parties would be
affected differently by the alleged causes of action, the complaint
improperly united the several causes of action; consequently, the
defendant's demurrer was sustained.
III. ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE
In Howard v. Riddle2 the supreme court affirmed the deci-
sion of Judge Price in the County Court, Greenville County, to
refuse plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict as to defendant's
liability for damages in an automobile accident. Plaintiff Dorothy
Howard brought the action against defendant Shirley Riddle
after the mishap, which was caused when the defendant lifted her
foot from her brakes, and her car rolled approximately three feet
and bumped the rear end of the plaintiff's vehicle while both had
been stopped at a traffic light. After all the testimony, the plain-
tiff moved for a directed verdict as to Mrs. Riddle's liability,
contending that the defendant's negligence was established as a
matter of law. The trial judge denied the motion, and the jury
returned a verdict for the defendant, from which an appeal was
made.
The sole issue on appeal concerned the lower court's refusal
to direct a verdict for the appellant." In a 3-2 decision, Justice
Rhodes upheld the trial court. The court cited with approval the
definition of actionable negligence stated in Gray v. Southern
Facilities, Inc.,44 that "[i]t is basic that a negligent act is not in
itself actionable and only becomes such when it results in injury
or damage to another."45 For the plaintiffs motion for a directed
41. 267 S.C. at 106, 226 S.E.2d at 253 (quoting Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 121 S.C.
at 75, 113 S.E. at 474-75).
42. 266 S.C. 149, 221 S.E.2d 865 (1976).
43. Id. at 150, 221 S.E.2d at 865.
44. 256 S.C. 558, 183 S.E.2d 438 (1971).
45. 266 S.C. at 151, 221 S.E.2d at 866 (quoting 256 S.C. at 567, 186 S.E.2d at 442).
The supreme court also relied on the relevant section from 65A C.J.S. Negligence §
251(6)(b) (1966):
Plaintiff must show, as a matter of law, not only that defendant was negligent
but also that his negligence was a contributing or proximate cause of the injury,
and plaintiff's motion must be denied where defendant's negligence, or that
such negligence proximately caused the injury, is not the sole conclusion which
reasonable men could draw from the evidence.
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verdict to prevail, it was necessary not only for the plaintiff to
establish the negligent act (in this case the admitted action of the
respondent in lifting her foot from the brake without exercising
due care), but also for her to prove "that such negligence was a
proximate cause of some damage to plaintiff."4 The matter of
damages was in sharp dispute during the lower court proceed-
ings;"7 therefore, no error was found for the trial judge's refusal
to direct the verdict reaching defendant's liability.
Chief Justice Lewis wrote the dissent which maintained that
the trial judge's failure to direct a verdict for the appellant on the
issue of respondent's liability was prejudicial error." The Chief
Justice reasoned that the case should have gone to the jury only
for a determination of damages, if any, since the act of negligence
(as the majority had agreed) was already proved as a matter of
law.'" Otherwise, on the strength of the record, it was impossible
for the supreme court to determine the basis for the jury's deci-
sion, which could have been either "(1) that there was no liability
or (2), as the majority now surmises, no damages were sus-
tained."',"
IV. WRONGFUL DEATH: ACTUAL NEGLIGENCE, FAMILY PURPOSE
DOCTRINE, EXCESSIVE DAMAGES
In Lucht v. Youngblood5' the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld a judgment for the plaintiff who, as administrator of his
deceased daughter's estate, had instituted an action for wrongful
death resulting from an automobile accident. Seventeen year old
Eileen Lucht was killed when the car in which she was a passen-
ger collided with a car driven by seventeen year old defendant
John Youngblood. The car was owned by defendant George
46. Id. at 151, 221 S.E.2d at 866.
47. The transcript of the proceedings in the lower court reveals that plaintiff had
continued to drive her car for at least a month after the accident, that she had seen her
doctor immediately after the accident, but not at all during the year preceding the trial,
and that she did not have an estimate of damages to her vehicle made until just prior to
trial, some 16 months after the accident. Also, the highway patrol was not called while
the parties conversed after the accident, nor did any patrolman respond when the plaintiff
called after defendant left the scene. Record at 9-18. Furthermore, the defendant testified
that during their conversation after the accident the plaintiff had agreed there was no
damage to her vehicle. Record at 26.
48. 266 S.C. at 153, 221 S.E.2d at 866.
49. Id. at 152, 221 S.E.2d at 866.
50. Id.
51. 266 S.C. 127, 221 S.E.2d 854 (1976).
[Vol. 29
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Youngblood, John's father. In the Common Pleas Court of
Charleston County, Judge Spruill entered judgment on a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff but reduced the jury's award of $168,000
to a total judgment of $103,000 against the defendants. Justice
Ness wrote for a 4-1 majority and addressed each of the four
points appealed by the defendants.
The collision occurred on an S-curve of a four lane Charles-
ton street divided by a double yellow line. The actual negligence
of the defendant driver was established at trial by evidence posi-
tioning the vehicles in the plaintiff's daughter's lane after the
accident and by a statement in the defendant driver's deposition
that he "didn't have time enough to cross that yellow line by
much."52 In dismissing defendant's contention that the evidence
failed to establish negligence, Justice Ness reasoned, "Certainly
the circumstantial evidence, combined with the admission of the
defendant was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the accident
was caused by the defendant's crossing the double yellow line
. . . .",' Furthermore, since the jury had been charged with the
doctrine of sudden emergency, its verdict was held to be a rejec-
tion of the defense, and the actual negligence of the defendant
was upheld.-4
Defendant George Youngblood, the father of the driver, was
made a party to the action under the family purpose doctrine.15
The doctrine is a judicial fabrication and expands the concept of
agency to make the parent responsible for the torts of a minor
child who lives in the parents' household and operates an automo-
bile provided by the parent for the use of the family. Established
in South Carolina in 1913 by Davis v. Littlefield," at a time when
universal automobile liability insurance was not required, the
doctrine still stands. Although ordinarily the application of the
doctrine is a question of fact for the jury to decide, in Lucht the
supreme court upheld the lower court's ruling that the doctrine
applied as a matter of law because the testimony below was un-
contradicted.' 7 The court also recognized that the family purpose
doctrine is still valid in South Carolina and was not, -as appellants
52. Id. at 132, 221 S.E.2d at 857.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 132 and n.1.
55. For a discussion of the family purpose doctrine in South Carolina, see Note, The
Family Purpose Doctrine, 18 S.C.L. Rav. 638 (1966).
56. 97 S.C. 171, 81 S.E. 487 (1913).
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argued, superseded by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibil-
ity Act. "18
A more difficult question was the appellants' argument that
the trial court had erred in prohibiting them from cross-
examining the plaintiff on his earlier pleadings in the case.5" Orig-
inally, the plaintiff had alleged that the driver of the car carrying
his daughter had negligently crossed the dividing line of the high-
way and, combined with John Youngblood's negligence, had
caused the accident. However, the complaint was amended, and
the driver of the car in which Eileen Lucht was riding was re-
leased by a covenant not to sue."0 The trial judge refused to allow
cross-examination concerning the prior pleading to insure that
the jury was not informed about the earlier named defendant's
release by covenant not to sue. The supreme court recognized the
difficulty facing the trial judge, who was "rightfully concerned
that if the defendants [sic] were examined on the prior plead-
ings, the existence of the covenants and its details would be
spread before the jury."6 But, nonetheless, the court ruled that
the trial judge should have allowed cross-examination with an
additional charge to the jury explaining the plaintiffs election of
defendants. This error was held not reversible, however, since the
"administrator was not a witness to the accident and would have
no way of knowing what transpired except from talking with wit-
nesses. Accordingly, any impeachment would have been of no
value .... ,,"2 Justice Littlejohn registered a dissent on this
issue, viewing the error as both erroneous and prejudicial.13 He
reasoned that "[i]f the jury had been told that the plaintiff had
previously represented to the court in a prior pleading that the
[driver of the car carrying his daughter] was across the center
line, the result might have been different."64
58, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-9-10 to 56-9-910 (1976). The appellant's argument was that
the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act served the same purpose for which the
family purpose doctrine had been created, that is, "to provide some form of financial
responsibility for a minor's use of a family vehicle," and therefore should be considered
to supersede the doctrine as a legislative enactment of public policy. Brief for Appellant
at 38-39. Two cases were noted specifically as authority for this contention: Jacobsen v.
Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949), and McMartin v. Saemisch, 254 Iowa 45,
116 N.W.2d 491 (1962). Brief for Appellant at 39-42.
59. 266 S.C. at 134, 221 S.E.2d at 857.
60. Id. at 134, 221 S.E.2d at 858.
61. Id. at 135, 221 S.E.2d at 858.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 139, 221 S.E.2d at 860.
64. Id. at 141, 221 S.E.2d at 861.
[Vol. 29
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The jury awarded the plaintiff $168,000 actual damages,
which the trial judge reduced to $110,000, from which $7,000 was
deducted as received under the covenant not to sue. The Young-
bloods contended that the remaining total judgment against
them of $103,000 was "so grossly excessive as to show that it was
actuated by passion, prejudice, sympathy and partiality . . . so
shocking as to require a new trial absolute. ' 6 5 But the supreme
court observed that although the largest verdict for a wrongful
death of a minor previously upheld in the South Carolina Su-
preme Court was $50,000 in 1955,66 they could not overlook the
impact of inflation and reduced buying power.67 Furthermore, in
1972 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed an award
of $125,000 by Judge Hemphill, the Federal District Judge, sit-
ting without a jury, in a wrongful death action of a minor. De-
spite the size of the verdict in Lucht, the supreme court did not
regard it as excessive.69
V. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Boyce v. Lancaster County Natural Gas Authority7" pre-
sented an opportunity for the South Carolina Supreme Court to
reconsider its position on whether quasi-municipal corporations
are immune to actions ex delicto because of the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity." In a 4-1 per curiam decision, the court con-
fronted the strong stare decisis effect of prior decisions and chose
not to alter the doctrine.
65. Id. at 135, 221 S.E.2d at 858.
66. Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 830 (1955).
67. 266 S.C. at 136, 221 S.E.2d at 858-59.
68. Adams v. Hunter, 343 F. Supp. 1284 (D.S.C. 1972), aff'd 471 F.2d 648 (4th Cir.
1973).
69. 266 S.C. at 138, 221 S.E.2d at 860. The court pointed out that the standard
applied for review of the excessiveness of jury verdicts was far from precise and quoted
Gruenfeld v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968): "The standard has been variously
phrased: 'Common phrases are such as: "grossly excessive," "inordinate," "shocking to
the judicial conscience," "outrageously excessive," "so large as to shock the conscience of
the Court," "monstrous," and many others.'" Id. at 159.
70. 266 S.C. 398, 223 S.E.2d 769 (1976).
71. The doctrine of sovereign immunity rests upon public policy considerations. An
outgrowth of the historical logic that the "King can do no wrong," the doctrine also shows
a reluctance to use public resources to redress private injuries or to subject the government
to embarrassing and inconvenient lawsuits. Additional support for the doctrine is taken
from the agency theory whereby agents of the state are always considered outside the scope
of their authority when they commit torts. For a broad treatment of the doctrine's back-
ground, its application to the states, and subsequent attempts to restrict its effects, see
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Plaintiff Adelaide T. Boyce commenced her action in Janu-
ary 1975, alleging that the agents, servants, and employees of the
defendant Lancaster County Natural Gas Authority (hereafter
the Authority) had negligently caused an explosion at her home
in Lancaster, South Carolina, in October 1973. Mrs. Boyce sought
$500,000 actual and punitive damages for personal injuries and
the destruction of her house and adjoining property. The defen-
dant demurred to the complaint on the ground that no cause of
action existed in tort against the Authority because it was a body
corporate and politic created by Act No. 879 of 1954 of the Gen-
eral Assembly and thus shared in the sovereign immunity of the
state. In the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Judge Gregory sustained the
demurrer and plaintiff appealed.
Appellant contended that section 4(a)72 of the act creating
the Authority granted the Authority the power "to sue or be
sued" and such power amounted to a waiver of immunity from
tort actions. The court felt that this contention was expressly
treated in Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public Service
Authority.7 3 In Rice, decided in 1950, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court had held that the Public Service Authority, having
the power to produce and sell electricity, was a governmental
agency and an integral part of the state and therefore was im-
mune from an action ex delicto.74 The Boyce court established
that the Authority, which had the power to buy and sell natural
gas, was, like the Public Service Authority in Rice, a quasi-
municipal corporation since the "manufacture and sale of power
is a public and governmental function"75 and as such enjoyed the
same immunity. As the Rice court had previously determined
that similar language did not waive this immunity, the Boyce
72. No. 879, [1954] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2325 provides in pertinent part: "SECTION
4. Powers - In order that the Authority shall be fully empowered to construct the
System, to operate it, and to enlarge and extend the same within the limits of its Service
Area, it shall be empowered: (a) To sue and be sued."
73. 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
74. The Public Service Authority had previously been held to be a "quasi-municipal
corporation, exercising certain governmental functions as an agency of the State" in
Creech v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 200 S.C. 127, 137, 20 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1942).
The Rice court agreed and further conferred upon it a sovereign status, stating:
"Manifestly, a quasi-municipal corporation, as an agency of the State, is also in a real
sense a part of the State, and shares in its sovereignty." 216 S.C. at 516, 59 S.E.2d at 138.
75. 266 S.C. at 401, 223 S.E.2d at 770 (citing Welling v. Clinton Newberry Natural
Gas Auth., 221 S.C. 417, 71 S.E.2d 7 (1952)). The court further compared the two agencies
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court declared that the language of section 4(a) could not be
interpreted as a waiver of the Authority's immunity to tort ac-
tion.76
The appellant additionally urged the court to recognize, as
a matter of public policy, that the Authority was subject to tort
liability for negligent acts committed when engaging in a com-
mercial or proprietary enterprise.17 The distinction between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions is recognized by the over-
whelming majority of jurisdictions, 7 but the court, acknowledg-
ing that the South Carolina courts have "consistently refused to
recognize a distinction between governmental and proprietary
76. 266 S.C. at 402, 223 S.E.2d at 770. After establishing the initial immunity of the
Public Service Authority, the Rice court determined that this immunity was not waived
by its creating act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-1 (1962) (current version at § 58-31-10 (1976)).
The court explained that such immunity was not waived unless it is expressly waived and
that "immunities attaching to sovereignty 'are never to be considered as waived or surren-
dered by any inference or indication.'" 216 S.C. at 516, 59 S.E.2d at 138 (quoting Brooks
v. One Motor Bus, 190 S.C. 379, 383, 3 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1939)).
In contrasting language identical to section 4(a) of Act No. 879 of the 1954 General
Assembly, the Rice court stated:
In the case of Sherbert v. School District No. 85, Spartanburg County, 169
S.C. 191, 168 S.E. 391, 393, the Court held that a statute providing that a school
district "may sue and be sued" cannot be construed "to make a school district
liable in an action ex delicto, as it is not so expressly provided by its terms."
It follows from what we have said that the power conferred upon the South
Carolina Public Service Authority "to sue or be sued" cannot reasonably be
construed to authorize an action ex delicto.
216 S.C. at 516, 59 S.E.2d at 138.
77. 266 S.C. at 402, 223 S.E.2d at 770.
78. The majority of states recognize this distinction. Functions of the municipal
corporation, which are proprietary or corporate, remove it from the protection of immunity
from suit usually enjoyed, and like a private corporation, a municipal corporation is held
responsible for negligent acts. In Boyce, the plaintiff urged the court to consider two
examples of this abrogation of sovereign immunity as adopted by sister states. In Koontz
v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972), the North Carolina court
reasoned as follows:
[W]e recognize merit in the modern tendency to restrict rather than to extend
the application of governmental immunity. This trend is based, inter alia, on
the large expansion of municipal activities, the availability of liability insur-
ance, and the plain injustice of denying relief to an individual injured by the
wrongdoing of a municipality.
Id. at 529, 186 S.E.2d at 908. The Virginia court, in Fenon v. City of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551,
125 S.E.2d 808 (1962), recognized this distinction:
In Virginia a municipal corporation is clothed with a twofold function - one
governmental and the other proprietary. A municipality is immune from liabil-
ity for failure to exercise or for negligence in the exercise of its governmental
functions. It may be liable, just as a private individual or corporation, for the
failure to exercise or for negligence in the exercise of its proprietary functions.
Id. at 555, 125 S.E.2d at 811.
15
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functions of a municipal corporation,"" s refused to draw the dis-
tinction here.
Finally, the court pointed to its decision in Belton v. Rich-
land Memorial Hospital," in which it refused to overrule or mo-
dify the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Boyce court adopted
the rationale of Belton:
We recognize that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been
assailed on many fronts and has been abolished or modified in
more than one-half of the states either by judicial decision or by
statute. While we have serious reservations about the soundness
and fairness of the doctrine and do not question the authority
of the courts to abolish it, we adhere to the view that reform in
this field should be left to the legislature. That body has not
been unmindful of the problem and over the years has enacted
a number of statutes waiving immunity in specified cases on
stated terms and conditions.8'
In an articulate and forceful dissent, Justice Ness expressed
"grave doubt about the continued vitality of the governmental
immunity doctrine in general" 8 and showed a particular disap-
proval of the narrower instance whereby a quasi-municipal body,
performing a proprietary function, is shielded by the
"impenetrable armor of governmental immunity" 83 while its pri-
79. 266 S.C. at 402, 223 S.E.2d at 770 (citing McKenzie v. City of Florence, 234 S.C.
428, 108 S.E.2d 825 (1959)).
80. 263 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241 (1975).
81. 266 S.C. at 402, 223 S.E.2d at 770 (quoting 263 S.C. at 450-51, 211 S.E.2d at 243).
It is important to note that the defense of charitable immunity is no longer available
to charitable hospitals. In Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Association, No. 20420
(S.C., filed May 10, 1977), the supreme court, per Justice Rhodes, held
that anyone injured through tortious acts of commission or omission of the
agents, servants, employees or officers of a charitable hospital in this State may
recover damages against such hospital, if the aggrieved party can establish that
the injuries occurred because of the hospital's heedlessness and reckless disre-
gard of the plaintiff's rights. This standard of proof is one which is higher than
that of simple negligence. It parallels that standard of proof required under S.C.
Code § 46-801 (1962), known popularly as the Automobile Guest Statute.
It is emphasized that only hospitals were affected by Brown. Cf. Crowley v. Bob Jones
Univ., No. 20421 (S.C., filed May 10, 1977) (concerning the charitable immunity of a
school). The apparent reason for this contraction of the defense of charitable immunity is
because hospitals obtain their revenues principally from paying patients rather than from
state or county appropriations and private contributions. (See n.3 of Brown.) This eco-
nomic rationale does not equally apply to other charitable institutions such as churches,
orphanages, or colleges. To allow hospitals adequate time to obtain liability insurance,
the court determined that the holding in Brown is to be applied only to appropriate claims
filed after May 10, 1977.
82. 266 S.C. at 403, 223 S.E.2d at 771.
83. Id.
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vate counterpart would not enjoy such protection. In his compre-
hensive treatment of the issue, Justice Ness traced the develop-
ment of the doctrine in the common law of the English and Amer-
ican courts" and urged that the pragmatic reasoning that re-
quired acceptance of the doctrine in its earlier history was no
longer valid and that the "purposes undergirding the broad and
indiscriminate application of the doctrine have long since van-
ished."," While the majority adopted the rationale of Belton,
which left reform to the legislature, as grounds for refusing to
abolish or modify the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the dissent
saw legislative inaction since Belton as an invitation for "judicial
revocation of the doctrine." 6 Stressing that the stare decisis im-
pact of earlier decisions is not binding when "out of touch with
the needs of the present day society, 87 Justice Ness viewed the
exemption of the Authority from liability as "unconscionable
. . . not in keeping with public policy . . . [and doing] little to
enhance the betterment of society." ' He concluded by urging
that the governmental-proprietary distinction be adopted by
South Carolina to insure that the respondent "accept the risks
and attendant responsibilities along with the fruits of its enter-
prise.". 9
Albert N. Wergley
84. Id. at 404-06, 223 S.E.2d at 771-72.
85. Id. at 405, 223 S.E.2d at 772.
86. Id. at 406, 223 S.E.2d at 772.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 407, 223 S.E.2d at 773.
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